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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION-",BENIGN" DISCRIMI-
NATION-INORITY ADMISSIONS PROGRAMS--UPREmE COURT'S RE-
SPONSE TO PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT-DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416
U.S. 312 (1974); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
And now let's go hand in hand, not one before the other
-Shakespeare, The Comedy of Errors act V, scene I
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment- the
most explicit constitutional recognition that all persons be considered
equal before the law--has been the major vehicle for removing the
economic and political barriers that once blocked minority entrance
into the mainstream of American life.' While many of the legal bar-
riers have disappeared, one must face the stark reality that judicial rhet-
oric cannot rectify the effects of generations of discrimination. The
under-representation of minorities among high school graduates, 4 col-
lege graduates, 5 and professionals6 is clearly related to the economic
1. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
2. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. Rnv. 1065 (1969).
3. Id.
4. In 1968 only fifty-eight percent of the black young adults had a high school di-
ploma, Kendrick, Extending Educational Opportunity-Problems of Recruitment, Ad-
missions, High Risk Students, 55 Lm. ED. 12, 13 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Recruit-
ment], and that fifty-eight percent formed only eight percent of all high school graduates
in the United States. Id. at 14. In the Los Angeles central city there are 14,000 Black
and 17,000 Spanish-surnamed Americans receiving high school diplomas annually. Hear-
ings Before Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on Utilization of Minorities and
Women Workers in Certain Major Industries 99 (Los Angeles, Cal. 1969) [hereinafter
cited as EEOC].
5. Figures for the academic year 1970-71 showed "substantial increases" in minority
college enrollment over the 1967-68 figures. O'Neil, Perferential [sic] Admissions-
Equalizing the Access of Minority Groups to Higher Education, 80 YALE L.J. 699, 719
(1971) [hereinafter cited as O'Neill. Since 1967-68, five to seven percent of all college
and university students have been black, although the figures are somewhat higher for
freshmen. Id. at 721.
If you are between the ages of 18 and 24 ...your chances of being in college
or a professional school are twice as great if you are a white than if you are a
Negro.
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deprivation that necessarily followed decades of legally created and
maintained discrimination.
Advocates of government action to remove the "badges" of discrim-
Dyer, Toward More Effective Recruitment and Selection of Negroes for College, 36 J.
NEGRO E). 216, 221 (1967). While blacks form twelve percent of the population and
twelve percent of the college age group, they comprise only six to seven percent of the
college students. Gellhorn, The Law School and the Negro, 1968 DUKE L.J. 1069, 1073
[hereinafter cited as Gellhorn]. In California there are 30,000 Blacks and 38,000
Spanish-surnamed Americans enrolled in college. EEOC, supra note 4, at 99.
6. In 1969 2.75% of the medical students were black, and if predominantly black
schools are excluded, only .9% of the students were black. N. GuMEo & A. HENDER-
SON, ADMVITING BLACK STUDENTS TO MmFrcAL AND DENTAL ScHooLs 7 (1971).
Less than one percent of the nation's lawyers are black. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at
1073. One white American in 625 becomes a lawyer, but only one in 7,100 blacks
chooses the legal profession. Id. In the 1964-65 academic year, of the 701 black law
students in ABA approved schools, 434 were in the 120 predominantly white schools, or
an average of 3.06 blacks per white school. That left 267 in the six predominantly black
law schools, or an average of 44.5 per black school. Carl, The Shortage of Negro Law-
yerv Pluralistic Legal Education and Legal Services for the Poor, 20 J. LEOAL ED. 21,
23 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Carl]. Today the enrollment of minority students is
higher, e.g., University of California, Boalt Hall, twenty-one percent; University of Cali-
fornia at Los Angeles, twenty percent; University of California at Davis, eighteen per-
cent. Hager, Reverse Racism: Does it Exist?, L.A. Times, Feb. 5, 1973, § 1, at 3, col.
5-8. Overall, however, only about seven percent of these students enrolled in full-time
accredited law schools are Black, Spanish-surnamed, American Indian or Asian. Id.
at 18, col. 1. Some of that seven percent may be in law school only because of prefer-
ential admissions. O'Neil, supra note 5, at 723. But see Summers, Preferential Admis-
sions: An Unreal Solution to a Real Problem, 1970 U. ToL. L. Rav. 377, 383 [herein-
after cited as Summers]. Of those black students who are in law schools, almost half
are in the predominantly black schools in the South. Comment, Current Legal Educa-
tion of Minorities: A Survey, 19 BuFF. L. REv. 639, 642 (1970).
A Pennsylvania survey found that, while ninety-eight percent of all students eventually
pass the bar examination, only seventy percent of the black law students who take the
exam eventually pass. The Report of the Philadelphia Bar Ass'n Special Comm. on
Penn. Bar Admission Procedures-Racial Discrimination in the Administration of the
Penn. Bar Examination, 44 TEMP. L.Q. 141, 150 (1971). Obtaining a proper college
education is often financially burdensome, Summers, supra at 387, a problem exacerbated
by the lack of available financial aid, O'Neil, Preferential Admissions: Equalizing Ac-
cess to Legal Education, 1970 U. TOL. L. REv. 281, 283. There is also a problem of
a lack of motivation. See McGee, Minority Students in Law School: Black Lawyers and
the Struggle for Racial Justice in the American Social Order, 20 Bumr. L. REv. 423, 428-
30 (1971). "Certainly, motivation is very important; and, without it, qualification and
opportunity are of little or no avail." Carl & Callahan, Negroes and the Law, 17 J,
LEGAL ED. 250, 252 (1965). "Negro youth in the North, as well as the South, have
been denied an inspiring image of the Negro lawyer, at least until recent years." Id.
at 254. But see Cosby, Black-White Differences in Aspirations Among Deep South
High School Students, 40 J. NEGRO Et). 17, 19-21 (1971). In many ghetto schools, stu-
dents are often discouraged from working toward higher educational goals. MALCOLM
X, AuToBIoGRAiHY OF MALCOLM X 36-37 (1966); Carl, supra at 25; Smith & Hughes,
'Spillover' Effect of the Black Educated, 4 J. BLAcx STuDIEs 52, 64 (1973). Often these
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ination are faced with the dilemma that the concept of equality pre-
vents preferential treatment for minorities in the same manner that it
prevents discriminatory treatment.7  Specifically challenged is the aca-
demic community's response to discrimination in American society-
minority admissions programs.8 These programs, which vary from
merely "tipping the scales in favor of one student rather than another
when all other factors are roughly equal" to others that establish
minority quotas which unconditionally admit students with "qualifica-
schools provide inadequate educations as well, with the result that minority students often
do not have the proper tools to successfully compete at a university or graduate school
with high academic standards. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601
(1971); Consalus, The Law School Admission Test and the Minority Student, 1970 U.
TOL. L. REv. 501, 509 [hereinafter cited as Admission Test]. For a discussion of how
ghetto schools do not psychologically prepare students for college as well as suburban
schools do, see Elkind, From Ghetto School to College Campus: Some Discontinuities
and Continuities, 1970 U. TOL. L. REv. 607.
In addition to financial barriers, lack of motivation, and inadequate education, the
minority student seeking admission faces the common university and graduate school
practice of relying on the results of standardized tests. Many claim that such tests can-
not measure all relevant variables (see Carl, supra at 25; Williams, On Black Intelli-
gence, 4 J. BLAcK STUDIEs 29, 36 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Williams]) and that they
are "culture-bound" because they measure the applicant's knowledge of the white middle
class experience. "A test is a cultural artifact." Adler, Intelligence Testing of the Cul-
turally Disadvantaged: Some Pitfalls, 37 J. NEGRO ED. 364, 365 (1968). See Hobson
v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom., Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d
175 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Williams, supra at 31; Note, The Legal Implications of Cultural
Bias in the Intelligence Testing of Disadvantaged School Children, 61 GEo. L.J. 1027,
1031 (1973).
Proponents of the standardized examinations explain that if the exam is a cultural
artifact then so are the colleges and graduate schools themselves. The proponents argue
that if one is to work within the Anglo-American legal system, he or she must be able to
work with the peculiarly Anglo-American concepts. Summers, supra at 391. The
Law School Admission Test [hereinafter cited as LSAT] is primarily a predictor of
success in the first year of law school. Id. at 390. As a predictor it is quite effective.
Admission Test, supra at 509. If the test is invalid, then perhaps this is true of the
entire grading system. Ramsey, Law School Admissions: Science, Art, or Hunch?, 12
J. LEGAL ED. 503, 506 (1960). This is a proposition that Ramsey ultimately rejects.
A valid LSAT should meet the following four criteria: (1) It must be relevant to the
ultimate goal; (2) It must be reliable and able to discriminate, between individuals; (3)
It must be objective; (4) It must be practical. Id. at 505.
7. See Comment, But Some Animals Are More Equal Than Others: A Look at the
Equal Protection Argument Against Minority Preferences, 12 DUQUESNE L. REv. 580
(1974).
8. Brooke, Introduction to the Symposium: Disadvantaged Students and Legal Educa-
tion-Program for Affirmative Action, 1970 U. TOL. L. REv. 277; O'Neil, supra note
5, at 700.
9. O'Neil, supra note 5, at 700 n.3.
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tions" significantly below the normal standard, 10 have dramatically in-
creased minority enrollments." While some argue that the very nature
of minority admissions contravenes the command of strict equality,' 2
absolutes have seldom characterized the process of constitutional ad-
judication.' 3 The validity of minority admissions can only be ascer-
tained by a careful weighing of competing values, examining "the
character of the classification in question, the individual interests af-
fected by the classification, and the governmental interests asserted in
support of the classification."' 4
I. A CASE IN POINTr-DeFunis v. Odegaard
In DeFunis v. Odegaard,'5 Marco DeFunis, after having been
denied admission to the University of Washington Law School, 1' com-
menced legal proceedings alleging that he "had been wrongfully de-
nied admission in that . . .persons were admitted to the law school
with lesser qualifications than those of plaintiff."' 7 The trial court, al-
though dismissing his prayer for damages,' ordered DeFunis admitted,
stating that the University's admissions policy which gave certain pref-
erences .to Blacks, Chicanos, Indians, and Filipinos 0 had deprived him
10. Id.
11. Id. at 700.
12. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 507 P.2d 1169 (Wash. 1973) (Hale, CJ., dissenting),
vacated and remanded as moot, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
13. See Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First Amendment, 21
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 29 (1973); Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment
Guarantees of Speech and Press?, 17 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1180 (1970); Tribe, The Su-
preme Court, 1972 Term-Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process
of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. Rav. 1 (1973).
14. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972) (Marshall, J.). See Gunther, The
Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972); Develop-
ments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
15. 507 P.2d 1169 (Wash. 1973), vacated and remanded as moot, 416 U.S. 312
(1974).
16. 507 P.2d at 1171-72.
17. Id. at 1172.
18. Id. Plaintiffs asked for injunctive relief in the form of an order to the University
to admit DeFunis or, in the alternative, damages in the amount of $50,000.
19. Id. at 1172-75. The University of Washington admissions procedures consisted of
evaluation by a Committee on Admissions and Readmissions which was composed of
six faculty members and three student members. Student applicants had to take the
LSAT and submit a copy of their transcripts along with letters of recommendation. The
application form gave the prospective student the option of noting his or her "dominant"
ethnic origin. At that point the admissions procedures bifurcated, with one procedure
for minority applicants and another for other students. Applicants with a Projected
First Year Average (PFYA) below 74.5 were reviewed by the chairperson of the Corn-
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of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment.
20
The Washington Supreme Court reversed, finding no constitutional
violation. Initially, the court addressed itself to the threshold issue of
"whether race can ever be considered as one factor" in law school ad-
missions, "or whether racial classifications are per se unconstitutional
... -21 The trial court, relying solely on Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,22 held that, since racial classifications are per se unconstitutional,
"a state law school can never consider race as one criterion in its selec-
tion of first-year students. 23 A majority of the court, interpreting the
mandate of Brown as prohibiting only invidious racial classifications,
concluded that there was surely a distinction between classifications
which divide the races and classifications which bring together the
races.
2 4
mittee while those above 77 were considered by the full committee. All files of minority
applicants, though, were considered by the full committee regardless of PFYA. Plain-
tiff's application was held with all the others between 74.5 and 76.99. The Committee
utilized such factors as PFYA, extra-curricular and community activities, employment,
and racial and ethnic background. Each committee member received a set of files to
review closely. The policy of the University as applied by the Committee was that:
More and more it became evident to us that just an open door, as it were, at the
point of entry to the University, somehow or other seemed insufficient to deal with
what was emerging as the greatest internal problem of the United States of
America, a problem which obviously could not be resolved without some kind of
contribution being made not only by the schools, but obviously, also, by the colleges
in the University and the University of Washington in particular, given the racial
distribution of this state....
So that was the beginning of a growing awareness that just an open-door sheer
equality in view of the cultural circumstances that produced something other than
equality, was not enough; that some more positive contribution had to be made to
the resolution of this problem in American life, and something had to be done by
the University of Washington.
Id. at 1175.
20. Id. at 1172.
21. Id. at 1178.
22. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
23. 507 P.2d at 1178. The trial court stated:
In 1954 the United States Supreme Court decided that public education must be-
equally available to all regardless of race.
After that decision the Fourteenth Amendment could no longer be stretched to
accommodate the needs of any race. Policies of discrimination will inevitably lead
to reprisals. In my opinion the only safe rule is to treat all races alike, and I feel
that is what is required under the equal protection clause.
Id.
24. Id. at 1179. Citing Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968), and
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), the court noted that
"the Constitution is color conscious to prevent the perpetuation of discrimination and
to undo the effects of past segregation." 507 P.2d at 1180. The reliance on Green
and Swann would seem to be misplaced because race was considered only in fashioning
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The court next faced the potentially difficult question of which
equal protection standard to apply.25 In rejecting the rational basis
test, the court noted that since Loving v. Virginia,2" which overturned
Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute,2 7 the strict standard has always
been applied to racial classifications. 2  Despite the fact that the clas-
sifications in this instance had a different, and indeed a laudable, goal
from those which had previously been set aside, the court concluded
that the effects were not benign with respect to those students denied
admission to the law school.
29
a remedy to dismantle legally created and maintained dual systems of education.
25. When a statutory classification is challenged as being violative of equal protection,
courts have generally utilized one of two accepted standards of review. See San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18-44 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 ,U.S. 330, 337 (1972); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142 (1972); McDonald v.
Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 806-07 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 658-63 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Under the traditional test, great lati-
tude is given to the state, and legislative schemes are seldom overturned if "rationally"
related to a legitimate state purpose. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973); Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410
U.S. 356 (1973); McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969); Kotch
v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947); F.S. Royster Guano Co.
v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920); Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61
(1911). The strict standard of review will be employed if the classification is found
to infringe upon a "fundamental" interest (the right to marry, Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967); the right to have children, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942);
the right to move from state to state, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); and
the right to vote, Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965)) or is identified as "suspect"
(those based on race, color, religion, or alienage, see, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717,
721-22 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971); McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-46 (1948)).
26. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
27. Id. at 10-11.
28. 507 P.2d at 1181-82. In San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973), the Court, in explaining why the class in Rodriguez was not suspect, artic-
ulated the "traditional indicia" of a suspect class:
mhe class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerless-
ness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political proc-
ess.
Id. at 28. One could plausibly assert that members of the white race are not "discreet
and insular" minorities deserving of special constitutional protection. But see Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
29. 507 P.2d at 1182. The Court stated:
It has been suggested that the less strict "rational basis" test should be applied
to the consideration of race here, since the racial distinction is being used to redress
the effects of past discrimination; thus, because the persons normally stigmatized
by racial classifications are being benefited, the action complained of should be con-
sidered "benign" and reviewed under the more permissive standard. However, the
minority admissions policy is certainly not benign with respect to nonminority stu-
dents who are displaced by it,
- yit
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Applying the strict test to the University's admissions procedure, the
court concluded that the state's interest "in providing all law students
with a legal education that will adequately prepare them to deal with
the societal problems which will confront them upon graduation '30
was sufficiently compelling to justify the racial preference. Noting the
critical role that the legal profession plays in policy-making and the
need for all segments of society to be represented, 31 the court deemed
the shortage of minority lawyers a compelling problem requiring racial
preferences in the law school's admissions policy.
2
Chief Justice Hale, applying his conceptions of equal protection,
stated that "constitutions are, and ever ought to be, color blind. 3
Citing previous holdings declaring racial classifications invalid, Chief
Justice Hale concluded:
If the Fourteenth Amendment stands for anything at all, . . . it stands
for the principle that all discrimination based on race, religion, creed,
color or ethnic background. . . is prohibited.34
Any analogy to the desegregation cases was rejected by the Chief
Justice because the primary goal in school desegregation cases was to
enhance the educational process for all children by invalidating actual
discriminatory practices, while the goal in DeFunis was to increase
minority lawyers.3 5 No argument was ever posited that the education
30. Id. at at 1183.
31. Id. at 1183-84.
32. Id. The court also rejected the plaintiff's contention that the admissions proce-
dure violated due process because it was arbitrary and capricious. The appropriate test,
according to the DeFunis majority, was stated as follows:
Arbitrary and capricious action of administrative bodies means willful and unrea-
soning action, without consideration and in disregard of facts or circumstances.
Where there is room for two opinions, action is not arbitrary or capricious when
exercised honestly and upon due consideration, even though it may be believed that
an erroneous conclusion has been reached.
Id. at 1185, quoting DuPont-Fort Lewis School Dist. No. 7 v. Bruno, 489 P.2d 171, 174
(Wash. 1971). Accordingly, it was concluded that the plaintiff had "failed to show that
the policy and procedures of the law school in denying him admission were so unreasoned
and in disregard of the facts and circumstances as to constitute arbitrary and capricious
action." 507 P.2d at 1187. Justice Hale, dissenting, disagreed. He specifically noted
that many students were rejected for no discernible reason or were accepted on the basis
of personality or political activism. Id. at 1194.
33. 507 P.2d at 1189.
34. Id. at 1198.
35. In State ex rel. Citizens Against Mandatory Bussing v. Brooks, 492 P.2d 536
(1972), the Washington Supreme Court sustained the action of the Seattle school district
ordering compulsory bussing to curtail de facto segregation. Chief Justice Hale rejected
the argument that Brooks was a potential barrier to the plaintiff's success:
Thee. is no genuine parallel between Mr. DeFvnis's qase ?md the cae of the
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provided to white students was enhanced by increasing minority enroll-
ment at the graduate school level. Further, he argued, even when
school boundaries were changed and bussing ordered, no child was
deprived of an education as must be the case in a program of special
minority admissions. 6
When the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in De-
funis v. Odegaard,3a many commentators thought that the case would
be the most significant discrimination decision since Brown.8  How-
ever, since DeFunis would complete his third year of law school and
receive his diploma regardless of any judicial resolution, the Court con-
cluded that the principle of mootness demanded that it refrain from
deciding a case that lacked the sufficient concreteness to warrant the
finding of an actual controversy. 9
1U. "BENIGN" DISCRIMINATION AND THE SUPREME COURT
The development of the "affirmative action" concept in the school
desegregation cases 40 requires that dual systems of education be dis-
mantled. Clearly, "affirmative action" in the context of eliminating
children required to ride the busses. There, we were dealing with a procedurally
sound administrative determination that every child, under the plan and the consti-
tution, would gain an integrated and thereby superior education at the expense of
no other child. . . . mhe Seattle school board was attempting to discharge its
constitutional duty of providing equality of educational opportunity for all children
within the district at the expense of no child or children.
Here we have precisely the opposite. Putting some applicants into the classroom
deprived a qualified applicant of his seat there. It operated to deprive him thereby
of the equal protection of the laws and at the same time granted to others privileges
and immunities not available to him on equal terms.
507 P.2d at 1199.
36. 507 P.2d at 1198-99.
37. 414 U.S. 1038 (1973).
38. E.g., May a State Law School Use Race as One Criterion for Admission?, 60
A.B.AJ. 429 (1974).
39. In reaching this conclusion, the Court disposed of two arguments. First, past
decisions had held that "the 'voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not
deprive the tribunal of power to hear and determine the case, i.e., does not make the case
moot."' 416 U.S. at 318, quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632
(1953). Here, that did not depend "at all upon a 'voluntary cessation' of the admis-
sions practices," but "upon the simple fact that DeFunis [was] in the final quarter of the
final year of his course of study . . . ." 416 U.S. at 318. Secondly, the Court deter-
mined that the issue presented was not "'capable of repetition, yet evading re-
view'. . . ." id. at 318-19, quoting Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S.
498, 515 (1911).
40. Keyes v. Denver School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S.
430 (1968).
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"state mandated or deliberately maintained dual school systems with
certain schools for Negro pupils and others for white pupils""' has not
raised serious constitutional questions. When the segregation, how-
ever, is de facto rather than de jure, it appears that there is no duty
to desegregate since "[a] federal remedial power may be exercised
'only on the basis of a constitutional violation' .... -"2 Whether or
not the school system itself may remedy de facto segregation has not
been resolved.43
41. Milliken v. Bradley, 94 S. Ct. 3112 (1974).
42. Id. at 3124. See Keyes v. Denver School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973);
Bradley v. School Bd. (Richmond), 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), af 'd by an equally
divided court, 412 U.S. 92 (1973); Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55, 59
(6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 847 (1967); Downs v. Board of Educ., 336 F.2d
988, 998 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1965); Bell v. School City of
Gary, 324 F.2d 209, 213 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964).
43. See Offerman v. Nitkowski, 378 F.2d 22, 24 (2d Cir. 1967) ("[tlhat there may
be no constitutional duty to act to undo de facto segregation, however, does not mean
that such action is unconstitutional"); Tometz v. Board of Educ., 237 N.E.2d 498, 503
(Ill. 1968) (the constitution permits voluntary state action aimed toward reducing and
eliminating de facto school segregation); School Comm. v. Board of Educ., 227 N.E.2d
729, 733 (Mass. 1967), appeal dismissed, 389 U.S. 572 (1968) (court would not ques-
tion legislative determination of remedy to balance racial percentages in school); Bala-
ban v. Rubin, 199 N.E.2d 375, 250 N.Y.S.2d 281, 377 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 881
(1965) (board of education acted reasonably in re-zoning for racial balance); State ex
rel. Citizens Against Mandatory Bussing v. Brooks, 492 P.2d 536, 540 n.2 (Wash. 1972)
("de jure" segregation "is not limited by geography or by the concept of an express pro-
vision of law"). See also O'Neil, Preferential Admissions: Equalizing Access to Legal
Education, 1970 U. TOL. L. REv. 281, 282 n.1; O'Neil, supra note 5, at 714-15; 48 TUL.
L. R.v. 403, 406 (1974).
The field of labor law has been suggested by some as a potentially useful source. See
Comment, But Some Animals Are More Equal Than Others: A Look at the Equal Pro-
tection Argument Against Minority Preferences, 12 DUQUtESNE L. REv. 580, 582 (1974).
Specifically, judicial resolution of the discrimination aspects of seniority systems (see
Local 189 Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969) cert. denied, 397
U.S. 919 (1970) (continued use of seniority system, neutral on its face, which had its
origins in discriminatory system violates Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964); Quarles
v. Philip Morris, 279 F. Supp. 505, 515 (E.D. Va. 1968) ("plain language of the (Civil
Rights] [Alet condemns as an unfair practice all racial discrimination affecting employ-
ment without excluding present discrimination that originated in seniority systems de-
vised before the . . . act")), recruitment policies (Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315,
330-31 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972) (minorities ordered hired on
a ratio of one to two until 20 minorities hired); Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor,
442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971) (executive order ("Philadel-
phia Plan") requiring affirmative action as a condition precedent to award of contracts
for federally financed projects upheld)), and standardized tests (Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (employment tests must "bear a demonstrable relation-
ship to successful performance of the jobs for which [they are] used")) deal tangentially
with the issue.
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Because of the unique position occupied by institutions of higher
education,
[w]ell established principles of public school desegregation have not
been applied generally to institutions of higher learning in the same man-
ner in which they have been applied to public schools below the college
level.44
Higher education is not compulsory; the decisions to study and where
to study after high school are based upon many subjective factors af-
fecting both the applicant and the school. 45  Thus far, the only judi-
cial interference with the admissions practices of institutions of higher
education has been to invalidate overtly discriminatory practices. Rec-
ognition has been extended to the subjective considerations that gen-
erally characterize the selection process, and absent a finding of arbi-
trariness or capriciousness, the decision of the school is seldom over-
turned.4
0
Given the factual context in which the desegregation cases have
arisen, one must look elsewhere to resolve the constitutional validity of
minority admissions. During the 1973 term of the Court, three cases
presented the vehicle for discussion, or resolution, of various minority
preference schemes. Justice Douglas, in his DeFunis v. Odegaard
47
dissent, discussed the constitutionality of law school minority admis-
sions programs; Kahn v. Shevin48 involved a Florida statute which gave
certain tax benefits to widows but not to widowers; and Morton v. Man-
cari49 unanimously upheld legislation which gave Indians employment
and promotion preferences by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The vary-
ing approaches taken by the Justices reflect the difficulty in reconciling
minority preferences with principles of equal protection.
A. DeFunis v. Odegaard
Justice Douglas, in his DeFunis dissent, condemned, as invidious dis-
crimination, any state sponsored preferences in the selection process.50
Although stating that the United States Constitution neither required
law schools to evaluate only test scores and grades nor prevented law
44. Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 453 F.2d 524, 527 (5th Cir. 1971).
45. O'Neil, supra note 5, at 702.
46. See note 32 supra.
47. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
48. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
49. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
50. 416 U.S. at 320.
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schools "from evaluating an applicant's prior achievements in light of
the barriers that he had to overcome,"'51 each application had to be
considered in a "racially neutral way":2
There is no constitutional Tight for any race to be preferred. The
years of slavery did more than retard -the progress of Blacks. Even a
greater wrong was done the whites by creating arrogance instead of hu-
mility and by encouraging the growth of the fiction of a superior race.
There is no superior person by constitutional standards. A DeFunis
who is white is entitled to no advantage by reason of that fact; nor is he
subject to any disability, no matter his race or color. Whatever his race,
he had a constitutional right to have his application considered on its
individual merits in a racially neutral manner.53
Continuing, Justice Douglas expressly rejected the argument that a
"compelling" state interest could supply sufficient justification for ra-
cial discrimination:
The Equal Protection Clause commands the elimination of racial bar-
riers, not their creation in order to satisfy our theory as to how society
ought to be organized. The purpose of the University of Washington
cannot be to produce Black lawyers for Blacks, Polish lawyers for Poles,
Jewish lawyers for Jews, Irish lawyers for Irish. It should be to pro-
duce good lawyers for Americans . . . . That is the point at the heart
of all our school desegregation cases . . . . A segregated admissions
process creates suggestions of stigma and caste no less than a segregated
classroom, and in the end it may produce that result despite its contrary
intentions. One other assumption must be clearly disapproved, that
Blacks or Browns cannot make it on their individual merit. That is a
stamp of inferiority that a State is not permitted to place on any law-
yer.54
51. Id. at 331.
52. Id. at 334. Justice Douglas viewed the LSAT as an evil which was necessary for
nonminority applicants, but which discriminated against minorities. His primary objec-
tion was to the cultural values which were examined by the tests:
Since LSAT reflects questions touching on cultural backgrounds, the Admissions
Committee acted properly in my view in setting minority applications apart for
separate processing. These minorities have cultural backgrounds that are vastly
different from the dominant Caucasian. Many Eskimos, American Indians, Fili-
pinos, Chicanos, Asian Indians, Burmese, and Africans come from such disparate
backgrounds that a test sensitively tuned for most applicants would be wide of the
mark for many minorities.
Id. The solution he proposed was to remand the case for a trial to determine
the validity of the LSAT. If the LSAT were found to discriminate against minorities,
Douglas advocated eliminating the test for minority applicants. Id. at 336.
53. Id. at 336-37.
54. Id. at 342-43. Since the University only included Blacks, Chicanos, Indians, and
Filipinos within the class extended preference, an irrebuttable presumption has been cre-
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Justice Douglas, although condemning racial preferences, would ac-
cord great latitude to schools in the admissions process.ss Decisions
should be made on the basis of individual attributes, rather than on
the basis of race.56 While such a requirement would seem to impose
greater administrative burdens on the university,57 the end result would
be an admissions process which lacks the stigma of any system based
on racial preferences.
B. Kahn v. Shevin
In Kahn v. Shevin,58 a widower sought to contest Florida's long-
standing provision which granted property tax relief exclusively to wid-
ows.59 Kahn, a widower living in Florida, applied for and was de-
nied similar tax relief.60 The Circuit Court of Dade County granted
Kahn's request for declaratory relief, holding that the Florida statute
unfairly discriminated on the basis of sex. 61 The Florida Supreme
Court, finding the necessary fair and substantial relation to the object
of the legislation 6 -reduction of the economic disparity between men
and women-reversed the lower court opinion.68
ated that only that class is imbued with the trait that the program is designed to take
into consideration. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (preg-
nant teacher unable to continue teaching duties); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 453
(1973) ("students who applied from out of state [were given no opportunity] to demon-
strate that they [had] become bona fide . . . residents"); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972) (unmarried fathers unqualified by statute to raise children); Bell v. Burson,
402 U.S. 535 (1971) (uninsured motorist involved in accident presumed at fault for the
purpose of license revocation); Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Su-
preme Court, 87 HAv. L. Rav. 1534 (1974).
55. 416 U.S. at 331-32.
56. But see Hughes, Reparations for Blacks?, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1063, 1073 (1968)
("the mere fact of a person's being black in the United States is a sufficient reason for
providing compensatory techniques even though that person may in some ways appear
fortunate in his personal background").
57. See note 80 infra.
58. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
59. Florida law provides:
Property to the value of five hundred dollars ($500) of every widow, blind
person, or totally and permanently disabled person who is a bona fide resident of
this state shall be exempt from taxation.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 196.202 (Supp. 1974).
60. 416 U.S. at 352.
61. Id.
62. Shevin v. Kahn, 273 So. 2d 72, 73 (Fla. 1973), quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71, 76 (1971). The court stated:
[U]ntil the steps taken toward legal equality result in equality in fact, a finding
of identity between the sexes at this time would rest on fiction and not fact.
273 So. 2d at 74.
63. 273 So. 2d at 74.
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Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, recognized that the fi-
nancial problems which face a woman living alone were far more de-
bilitating than those facing a man alone: 4
There can be no dispute that the financial difficulties confronting the
lone woman in Florida or in any other State exceed those facing the
man. Whether from overt discrimination or from the socialization proc-
ess of a male-dominated culture, the job market is inhospitable to the
woman seeking any but the lowest paid jobs .... While the widow
can usually continue in the occupation which preceded his spouse's
death, in many cases the widow will find herself suddenly forced into
a job market with which she is unfamiliar, and in which, because of her
former economic dependency, she will have fewer skills to offer.65
According the statutory scheme minimal scrutiny,66 Justice Douglas con-
cluded that "Florida's differing treatment of widows and widowers
'rest[s] upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation.' "67
While minimally scrutinizing classifications based upon sex is clearly
consistent with previous holdings, Justice Douglas had joined the plu-
rality in Frontiero v. Richardson"" in urging that "classifications based
64. 416 U.S. at 353. See Johnston & Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study
in Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 675 (1971); Kennedy, Sex Discrimination:
State Protective Laws Since Title VII, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 514 (1972); Read & Peter-
sen, Sex Discrimination in Law School Placement, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 639 (1972); Note,
Employment Practices and Sex Discrimination: Judicial Extension of Beneficial Female
Protective Labor Laws, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 133 (1973); Comment, Sex Discrimination
in Hiring Practices of Private Employers: Recent Legal Developments, 48 TuL. L. REv.
125 (1973).
65. 416 U.S. at 353-54 (footnotes omitted).
66. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword." In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protectidn, 86 HARv. L.
REV. 1, 8 (1972).
67. 416 U.S. at 355, quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
68. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). In Frontiero, the Court invalidated federal statutes which
required a servicewoman to prove that her husband was in fact dependent upon her for
support for the purpose of obtaining increased housing allowances and medical and den-
tal benefits. 10 U.S.C. § 1072(2)(c) (1970);,Act of Sept. 7, 1962, Pub. L. 87-649, 76
Stat. 469, as amended, 37 U.S.C.A. § 401 (West Supp. 1974). A serviceman could
claim his wife as a dependent without regard to whether or not she was in fact depend-
ent upon him for support. 10 U.S.C. § 1072(2)(a) (1970); Act of Sept. 7, 1962, Pub.
L. 87-649, 76 Stat. 469, as amended, 37 U.S.C.A. § 401 (West Supp. 1974). Justice
Brennan's plurality opinion, joined in by Justices Douglas, White and Marshall, cate-
gorized sex as a suspect classification and invalidated the statutory scheme because of
the absence of a compelling state interest. 411 U.S. at 688-91. Justice Powell, joined
by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, expressly declined to reach the question
of whether or not sex is a suspect classification on the ground that the result was sup-
ported by Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 411 U.S. at 691-92.
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upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or national
origin, are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to close
judicial scrutiny."' 9
Justice Douglas' position can be reconciled with Frontiero on the
basis that Kahn, unlike Frontiero, did not involve a statutory scheme
which saddled any disabilities upon women. Language from Kahn
supports this analysis:
This is not a case like Frontiero v. Richardson where the Government
denied its female employees both substantive and procedural benefits
granted males "solely . . . for administrative convenience." We deal
here with a state law reasonably designed to further the state policy of
cushioning the financial impact of spousal loss upon the sex for which
that loss imposes a disproportionately heavy burden. 70
Justice Douglas also noted that the statutes invalidated by the Frontiero
plurality were
"not in any sense designed to rectify the effects of past discrimination
against women. On the contrary, these statutes seize upon a group--
women-who have historically suffered discrimination in employment,
and rely on the effects of this past discrimination as a justification for
heaping on additional economic disadvantages." 7'
Given Justice Douglas' statements in DeFunis that racial preferences
are constitutionally defective 7 2 together with his Frontiero concur-
rence, it is difficult to conclude that sex-based preferences are constitu-
tionally sound. Perhaps, Justice Douglas' analysis can best be ex-
plained by the fact that Kahn involved tax classifications, an area tra-
ditionally accorded minimal scrutiny by the Court.78
Justices Brennan and Marshall, adhering to their position in Fron-
tiero, 4 concluded that a gender-based classification "must be subjected
to close judicial scrutiny, because it focuses upon generally immutable
69. 411 U.S. at 682 (footnotes omitted).
70. 416 U.S. at 355 (footnotes omitted).
71. Id. at 355 n.8, quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 689 n.22 (1973).
72. See notes 50-57 supra and accompanying text.
73. See Lehnhausen v.'Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 355 (1973); Allied Stores
of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1959); Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S.
40, 44-47 (1934); Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n, 286 U.S. 276, 283 (1932); T. Moon
& W. Moon, The Property Tax, Governmental Services, and Equal Protection: A Ra-
tional Analysis, 18 VILL. L. REv. 527 (1973); Sturve, The Less-Restrictive-Alternative
Principle and Economic Due Process, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1463 (1967); Tussman & ten-
Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF, L. Ryv. 341 (1949).
74. See note 68 supra,
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characteristics over which individuals have little or no control, and also
because gender-based classifications too often have been inexcusably
utilized to stereotype and stigmatize politically powerless segments
of society. ' 75 Although stating that the provision of "special benefits
for a needy segment of society long the victim of purposeful discrim-
ination and neglect. . . serves the compelling state interest of achiev-
ing equality for such groups, '70 they nevertheless concluded that the
statute was unconstitutional because
the State has not borne its burden of proving that its compelling interest
could not be achieved by a more precisely tailored statute or by use of
feasible, less drastic means. 77
The statute was plainly overinclusive since widows with adequate fi-
nancial means were extended the tax benefits.78 Since Florida had
"offered nothing to explain why inclusion of widows of substantial
economic means was necessary to advance the State's interest in amel-
iorating the effects of past economic discrimination against women ' 79
and since an alternative means of tailoring the tax exemption to ex-
clude persons with ample financial resources was readily available,80
the strict standard had not been met.
81
75. 416 U.S. at 357.
76. Id. at 358-59.
77. Id. at 360.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. The Court noted that only those widows who filed a form establishing them-
selves as widows qualified for the exemption. Id. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 196.011
(Supp 1974). Justice Brennan concluded that "[bly merely redrafting that form to ex-
clude widows who earn annual incomes, or possess assets, in excess of specified amounts,
the State could readily narrow the class of beneficiaries to those widows for whom the
effects of past economic discrimination against women have been a practical reality."
416 U.S. at 360. Although such a requirement would impose an additional administra-
tive burden on the state, administrative convenience has never been a sufficient justifica-
tion where precious human values are at stake. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 690 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634-38 (1969).
81. 416 U.S. at 360. Justice White, dissenting, stated:
It may be suggested that the State is entitled to prefer widows over widowers be-
cause their assumed need is rooted in past and present economic discrimination
against women. But this is not a credible explanation of Florida's tax exemption;
for if the State's purpose was to compensate for past discrimination against females,
surely it would not have limited the exemption to women who are widows. More-
over, even if past discrimination is considered to be the criterion for current tax
exemption, the State nevertheless ignores all those widowers who have felt the ef-
fects of economic discrimination, whether as a member of a racial group or as one
of the many who cannot escape the cycle of poverty. It seems to me that the State
in this case is merely conferring an economic benefit in the form of a tax exemption
and has not adequately explained why women should be treated differently than
men.
Id, at .61-62 (emphasis added),
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C. Morton v. Mancari
In Morton v. Mancari,8 2 the Court also had occasion to examine the
equal protection challenge of a nonminority. Non-Indian employees
of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) brought a class action claiming
that provisions of the Indian Reorganization Act of 193418 granting
employment preferences to qualified Indians in the BIA84 violated the
Equal Employment Opportunities Act of 197281 and the fifth amend-
82. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
83. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 383, 48 Stat. 984-88. The main purpose of this Act
was to conserve and develop Indian lands and resources. The Act imposed restrictions
on sales of land to, and inheritance by, non-Indians. The Secretary of Interior was
enabled to acquire land for incorporation into tribal estates, and expenditures of up to
two million dollars per year were authorized for this purpose. 25 U.S.C. §§ 464-65
(1970). Expenditures were authorized to defray the expense of organizing Indian char-
tered corporations "for the purpose of promoting the economic development of the
tribes." Id. § 470. Tuition loans were made available to assist Indian attendance at
"recognized vocational and trade schools." Id. § 471. Finally, Indians were exempted
from civil service rules to promote and increase Indian employment in the Bureau of
Indian Affairs. Id. § 472. See Haas, The Legal Aspects of Indian Affairs from 1887
to 1957, 311 Tn ANNALS 12, 19-22 (1957).
At the same time, legislation was enacted to develop Indian self-government through
federal-state cooperation. Act of Apr. 16, 1934, ch. 147, § 1, 48 Stat. 596 (codified
at 25 U.S.C. § 452 et seq. (1970)). The Act authorized the Secretary of Interior to enter
into contracts with the states, territories, and private institutions to provide education,
medical assistance, agricultural assistance, and social welfare assistance to Indians
through established agencies. Haas, The Legal Aspects of Indian Affairs From 1887
to 1957, 311 Tn ANNALS 12, 19 (1957).
84. 25 U.S.C. § 472 (1970), which provides:
The Secretary of the Interior is directed to establish standards of health, age,
character, experience, knowledge, and ability for Indians who may be appointed,
without regard to civil-service laws, to the various positions maintained, now or
hereafter, by the Indian Office, in the administration of functions or services affect-
ing any Indian tribe. Such qualified Indians shall hereafter have the preference to
appointment to vacancies in any such positions.
(Emphasis added).
In 1972, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, with the approval of the Secretary of
Labor, issued the following directive:
The Secretary of the Interior announced today [June 23, 1972] he has approved
the Bureau's policy to extend Indian preference to training and to filling vacancies
by original appointment, reinstatement, and promotion. . . . The new policy pro-
vides as follows: Where two or more candidates who meet the established qualifica-
tion requirements are available for filling a vacancy, if one of them is an Indian,
he shall be given preference in filling the vacancy.
Quoted at 417 U.S. at 538 n.3.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Supp. II 1972). The Equal Opportunities Act of 1972
extended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970))
to employment practices of the United States government. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a)
(Supp. II 1972) provides:
All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment (except
with regard to aliens employed outside the limits of the United States) in military
departments as defined in section 102 of Title 5, in executive agencies (other than
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ment.86 A three-judge court was convened and held that the 1972 Act
implicitly repealed the employment preference provision of the 1934
Act.8 7
The preference granted by the Wheeler-Howard Act extended to
initial hiring and promotion, but not to reductions in the work force.""
The policy behind the hiring preferences clearly emerged from a read-
ing of the legislative history. The need to promote self-reliance and
self-government among the Indian tribes was of primary importance
to the 1934 Congress.80  Senator Wheeler, co-sponsor of the Act,
explained:
We are setting up in the United States a civil service rule which pre-
vents Indians from managing their own property. It is an entirely dif-
ferent service from anything else in the United States, because these In-
dians own this property. It belongs to them. What the policy of this
Government is and what it should be is to teach these Indians to manage
their own business and control their own funds and -to administer their
own property, and the civil service has worked very poorly so far as the
Indian Service is concerned .... 90
Congress, not unmindful of the potential disadvantages to non-In-
dians within the BIA, nevertheless concluded that the advantages to
the Indian community outweighed the disadvantages to the other BIA
employees. 91 The goals of the legislation were three-fold: first, it
the General Accounting Office) as defined in section i5 of Title 5 (including em-
ployees and applicants for employment who are paid from nonappropriated funds),
in the United States Postal Service and the Postal Rate Commission, in those
units of the Government of the District of Columbia having positions in the com-
petitive service, and in those units of the legislative and judicial branches of the
Federal Government having positions in the competitive service, and in the Library
of Congress shall be made free from any discrimination based on race, color, re-
ligion, sex, or national origin.
86. While the fifth amendment does not contain an equal protection clause, the Su-
preme Court, in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), stated that "discrimination may
be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process." Id. at 499. Since Boiling the due
process clause has been applied as though it contained an equal protection clause. See
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 680 (1973); United States Dep't of Agriculture
v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 680 (1973).
87. 417 U.S. at 537.
88. 25 U.S.C. § 472 (1970). See note 84 supra.
89. 417 U.S. at 541-45.
90. Hearings on S. 2755 and S. 3645 Before the Senate Committee on Indian Af-
fairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 256 (1934), quoted at 417 U.S. at 541. Congress-
man Hastings stated:
It is urged -that the employees of an Indian community should be largely Indian.
I am in sympathy with that suggestion. This could be done by amending the civil-
service laws.
78 CONG. Ruc. 9269 (1934).
91. 78 CONG. REc. 11737 (1934) (remarks of Congressman Carter).
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was designed to give Indians greater participation in their own self-
government; second, it fulfilled the government's trust obligation to-
ward the Indian tribes; and third, it decreased the detrimental effect
of having non-Indians administer Indian tribal life. 12  In the congres-
sional judgment, this preference was necessary to promote Indian com-
petition on an equal basis with the rest of American society. 8
After concluding that the Indian preference had not been implicitly
repealed by the Equal Opportunities Act of 1972,9' the unanimous
Court addressed itself to the question of whether or not the preference
constituted invidious racial discrimination. 5  Noting that article one,
section eight, clause three98 of the United States Constitution gives
Congress plenary power to deal with Indian problems,97 the Court
stated that "[literally every piece of legislation dealing with Indian
tribes . . . single[s] out for special treatment a constituency of tribal
Indians living on or near reservations." 98 Were such legislation to con-
stitute invidious racial discrimination, "an entire Title of the United
States Code . . would be effectively erased and the solemn commit-
ment of the Government toward the Indians would be jeopardized.""9
It was against this background that the Court examined the constitu-
tional validity of the preference system.
92. 417 U.S. at 541-43.
93. Id. at 543-44.
94. Id. at 545-51. The Court's conclusion that Congress had not intended to repeal
the Indian preference was based on four factors. First, provisions of the 1964 Act ex-
cluded tribal employment and certain preferential treatment by business on or near a res-
ervation. Id. at 547-48. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), 2000e-2(i) (1970). Second, after
passage of the 1972 Act, Congress enacted new Indian preference laws in the area of
education. 417 U.S. at 548-49. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 887c(a), (d), 1119a (Supp. II 1972).
Third, since Indian preferences had previously been excepted from executive orders for-
bidding discrimination in employment by government agencies (see, e.g., Exec. Order No.
10,577, 19 Fed. Reg. 7521 (1954); Exec. Order No. 7423, 1 Fed. Reg. 885 (1936))
and since the 1972 Act was essentially a codification of the anti-discrimination orders,
it could not be presumed that Congress intended to "erase" the preferences. 417 U.S.
at 549. Finally, the Court noted that "'repeals by implication are not favored.'
Id., quoting Posedas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1963).
95. 417 U.S. at 551.
96. The Congress shall have Power ....
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes ....
U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
97. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 536, 557-59 (1832). See U.S. SOLICrroR
FOR THm DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, FEDERAL IN'DIN LAw (1958).
98. 417 U.S. at 552.
99. Id.
[Vol. 8
RECENT DECISIONS
Initially, the Court made the curious assumption that the employ-
ment preference was "not even a 'racial' preference": 100
Rather, it is an employment criterion -reasonably designed to further the
cause of Indian self-government and to make the BIA more responsive
to the needs of its constituent groups. . . . The preference .. . is
granted to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as members
of quasi-sovereign tribal entities whose lives and activities are governed
by the BIA in a unique fashion. 10'
The test to be applied in such cases is whether or not "the special
treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique
obligation toward the Indians .... 1102 Here, the employment pref-
erence was said to rationally further the congressional policy of Indian
self-government.
0 8
Mancari, although arising against a background of two-hundred
years of special congressional concern for Indians, 04 raises speculation
as to the applicability of the Courtes reasoning to minority admissions.
Clearly, the Court's conclusion that the employment preference is not a
"racial" preference is hardly satisfying. The non-Indian denied em-
ployment or promotion solely on the basis of the immutable charac-
teristic of his or her birth as a non-Indian surely will not take com-
fort in such tenuous distinctions. A more correct analysis would seem
to lie in the acknowledgement that there is in fact a racial prefer-
ence; the question then becoming whether or not the preference is
constitutionally sound. Language from Mancari suggests an approach.
Here, the preference is reasonably and directly related to a legitimate,
nonracially based goal. This is the principal characteristic that gener-
ally is absent from proscribed forms of racial discrimination. 0 5
100. Id. at 553.
101. Id. at 554. The Court stated:
The preference is not directed towards a "racial" group consisting of "Indians";
instead, it applies only to members of "federally recognized" tribes. This operates
to exclude many individuals who are racially to be classified as "Indians." In this
sense, the preference is political rather than racial in nature.
Id. at 553 n.24. It is difficult to agree with the Court's conclusion that the preference is
not "racial in nature." While only certain Indians are accorded the preference (e.g.,
Cherokee, Apache, Arapaho, Chickasaw, etc.), all others are disadvantaged solely by
virtue of their birth as non-Cherokee, non-Apache, non-Arapaho, non-Chickasaw, etc.
Clearly, some racial groups are being preferred over others.
102. Id. at 555.
103. Id. at 554. See Comment, The Indian Bill of Rights and the Constitutional
Status of Tribal Governments, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1343 (1969).
104. See U.S. SoLIcrroR FOR THE DEPARTmNT OF INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDImN LAw
(1958).
105. 417 U.S. at 554,
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Whether or not minority admissions is a "legitimate, nonracially based
goal" is yet to be considered by the Court.
CONCLUSION
The underlying goal of any minority admissions program is to seek
to redress imbalances created by political and economic deprivation.100
Whether or not this goal can be squared with principles of equal protec-
tion is problematical given the recent pronouncements in DeFunis,
Kahn, and Mancari. From a consideration of these cases, it is evident
that the possible approaches are numerous and seemingly inconsistent.
Thus, for example, one finds Justice Douglas supporting the widow and
Indian preferences in Kahn and Mancari, while vigorously opposing the
racial preference in DeFunis.
The unpredictability of any Supreme Court resolution of minority
preferences clearly casts doubt on the validity of minority preferences
throughout the country. Should the Court be inclined to resolve the
controversy, it is suggested that the approach advocated by Justice
Douglas presents the sensible and appropriate solution. As Justice
Douglas correctly concludes, special consideration should be given in
a "racially neutral manner."'10 7 To give preference to the child of a
Boston lawyer solely because he or she is black and to deny preference
to the child of an Appalachia coal miner solely because he or she is
white does violence to the principle that the "Constitution is color-
blind."'' 8  Such benign policies are fraught with danger and can con-
ceivably inflame racial prejudice.
Such treatment, even though intended to neutralize discrimination and
to achieve educational equality, may actually generate more private prej-
udice. Blacks as well as whites may instinctively attribute the prefer-
ential treatment of a minority race to a low assessment of its capabili-
ties. 0 9
While there may have once been a time when colleges and univer-
sities only considered grades and test scores,"10 many subjective con-
siderations now permeate the admissions process."' Indicia such as
106. See O'Neil, supra note 5, at 699.
107. See text accompanying notes 50-57 supra.
108. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
109. Birnbaum, Who Should Go?, in OPEN ADMISSIONS AND EQUAL AccEss 121 (P.
Rever ed. 1970); Vieira, Racial Imbalance, Black Separatism, and Permissible Classifi-
cations by Race, 67 MICH. L. Rnv. 1553, 1611 (1969). See Hughes, Reparations for
Blacks?, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1063, 1072 (1968).
110. O'Neil, supra note 5, at 702.
111. Id.
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recommendations, extra-curricular activities, leadership qualities, and
community service are often considered." 2 Unless the Court is pre-
pared to declare intelligence the sole criterion for college admis-
sions,:"' the consideration of one's economic or cultural background
should not raise serious objections.
Judith Ilene Bloom
112. Id.
113. See generally Note, Equal Protection and Intelligence Classifications, 26 STAN.
L. REv. 647 (1974).
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